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  Introduction 
Jacqueline McMurtrie* 
 
Many of the articles in the Seattle Journal for Social Justice (SJSJ) 
Spring 2013 issue were inspired by the Third Annual Conference on Public 
Defense (Conference) held at Seattle University School of Law on March 8, 
2013. The conference is sponsored by the law school’s Defender Initiative, 
a project dedicated to elevating the quality of indigent representation and 
improving the overall fairness of our criminal justice system through 
research, advocacy, and education. As in years past, experts from practice 
and academia convened at the law school to examine and reflect upon the 
current state of public defense across the country. However, the 2013 
gathering took place at a time of historic significance. Fifty years earlier, on 
March 19, 1963, the Supreme Court issued the landmark decision of Gideon 
v. Wainwright.1 In Gideon, the Court held that defendants charged with 
felonies in state court who are too poor to hire a lawyer are entitled to 
appointed counsel. 
An accused person’s fundamental right to an attorney, despite the ability 
to pay, is now engrained in our national fabric.2 The routine advice given to 
an arrested suspect about that right is portrayed on television, film, and 
depicted in novels and works of non-fiction. The man behind the case 
guaranteeing an indigent’s right to counsel— Clarence Earl Gideon—was 
                                                                                                                           
*   Associate Professor of Law; Director of Innocence Project Northwest at the University 
of Washington School of Law. 
1 372 U.S. 335 (1965). 
2 See Robert C. Boruchowitz, Fifty Years After Gideon: It is Long Past Time to Provide 
Lawyers for Misdemeanor Defendants Who Cannot Afford to Hire Their Own, 11 
SEATTLE J. FOR SOC. JUST. 891 (2013). 
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memorialized in Anthony Lewis’s engaging book Gideon’s Trumpet.3 
Gideon, charged by the state of Florida with the felony offense of breaking 
into a poolroom with the intent to commit a crime, asked the trial judge to 
provide him with a lawyer.4 Gideon’s request was refused since existing 
Florida law only allowed counsel to be appointed for defendants charged 
with capital offenses.5 Consequently, Gideon went to trial without a lawyer. 
He defended himself “about as well as could be expected by a layman,” and 
was eventually convicted by a jury and sentenced to five years in prison.6 
Gideon’s handwritten petition to the United States Supreme Court for a 
writ of certiorari, penciled in on lined paper, was granted.7 Because he was 
indigent, the Court appointed counsel to represent him and move the case 
forward through briefing and argument.8 The resulting decision, less than 
ten pages in its entirety, was breathtaking in its reach. It unanimously held 
that the federal Sixth Amendment right to counsel was made obligatory on 
the states by the Due Process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. In so 
ruling, the Court overturned the twenty-year precedent of Betts v. Brady 
holding to the contrary.9 The Gideon Court proclaimed that lawyers in 
criminal proceedings are “necessities, not luxuries” and held that the right 
to counsel was “fundamental and essential to fair trials.”10 In other words, 
the Court recognized that the right to counsel is important not only to the 
accused person, but also indispensable to the broader societal interest of 
ensuring that our system of justice is fair. 
Gideon’s judgment was reversed, and his case was remanded to the 
Supreme Court of Florida.11 On re-trial, his attorney Fred Turner brought 
                                                                                                                           
3 ANTHONY LEWIS, GIDEON’S TRUMPET (1964). 
4 Gideon, 372 U.S. at 337. 
5 Id. 
6 Id. 
7 LEWIS, supra note 3. 
8 Gideon, 372 U.S. at 338. 
9 Id. at 339-42. 
10 Id. at 344. 
11 Id. at 345. 
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with him what his client lacked—expertise, skill, and knowledge of the 
law.12 Turner researched legal issues and argued a series of pre-trial 
motions; he reviewed the jury list in advance and knew which individuals to 
excuse without comment; and he possessed an understanding of the 
courtroom and community culture.13 Perhaps most importantly, Turner 
spent three days interviewing witnesses and investigating the background of 
the State’s star witness, something his imprisoned client was not able to do 
before his first trial.14 Information gathered during the investigation yielded 
fodder for Turner’s withering cross-examination of the State’s key witness 
and uncovered exculpatory information not proffered at the first trial.15 
Presented with this new evidence, the jury took only an hour and five 
minutes to acquit.16 After spending almost two years in prison, Gideon 
struggled to contain his emotions upon obtaining his freedom.17 When 
asked by a reporter whether he accomplished anything, Gideon replied: 
“Well, I did.”18 
Many of the articles in this current issue of the SJSJ question what our 
society has accomplished in the fifty years since Gideon was decided. The 
authors examine instances of Gideon’s unfulfilled promise through the 
outright denial of counsel,19 or the constructive denial of counsel through 
crushing caseloads and a “meet, greet, and plead” mentality.20 They call for 
the expansion of Gideon’s promise, in part by relying on its foundational 
principle of ensuring a fair system of justice.21 A collective call for reform 
                                                                                                                           
12 LEWIS, supra note 3, at 249-50. 
13 Id. at 239, 241 & 249. 
14 Id. at 250. 
15 Id. at 242-48. 
16 Id. at 249. 
17 Id. at 250. 
18 Id.  
19 Boruchowitz, supra note 2, at  891. 
20 Steven Zeidman, Gideon: Looking Backward, Looking Forward, Looking in the 
Mirror, 11 SEATTLE J. FOR SOC. JUST.  933 (2013). 
21 Nancy P. Collins, Does the Right to Counsel on Appeal End as You Exit the Court of 
Appeals, 11 SEATTLE J. FOR SOC. JUST. 987 (2013); Travis Stearns, Legal Financial 
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is sounded throughout this issue, with every author acknowledging that 
Gideon’s promise remains unfulfilled. The authors discuss innovative 
solutions such as court rules,22 collaborative networking,23 and the 
framework of interdisciplinary research24 as potential avenues of reform. 
It is fitting that this issue, with reflections on Gideon’s fiftieth 
anniversary, is published in Washington State. Long before Gideon, in 
1854, the territory of Washington provided counsel to defendants who could 
not afford a lawyer.25 Continuing the protection of an accused person’s 
right, Washington was the first state in the nation to guarantee the right to 
appeal to individuals convicted of crimes.26 More recently, the Washington 
Supreme Court adopted a rule of professional responsibility prohibiting 
attorneys from entering into indigent defense service contracts─which 
require them to bear the cost of providing conflict counsel, investigation, or 
expert services, unless a fair and reasonable amount for the costs is 
specifically designated in the contract, in a manner that does not adversely 
affect the income or compensation allocated to the attorney.27 Washington is 
also the first state in the country to adopt a rule establishing qualification 
standards, and caseload limits, for public defenders.28 
                                                                                                                           
Obligations: Fulfilling the Promise of Gideon by Reducing the Burden, 11 SEATTLE J. 
FOR SOC. JUST. 963  (2013). 
22 The Undersigned Attorney Hereby Certifies – The Washington Supreme Court Rule on 
Standards and Its Implications, 11 SEATTLE J. FOR SOC. JUST. 1005 (2013) [hereinafter 
Undersigned Attorney]. 
23 Kim Taylor-Thompson, Gideon at Fifty – Golden Anniversary or Mid-Life Crisis, 11 
SEATTLE J. FOR SOC. JUST. 867 (2013). 
24 Janet Moore, G Forces: Gideon v. Wainwright and Matthew Adler’s Move Beyond 
Cost-Benefit Analysis, 11 SEATTLE J. FOR SOC. JUST. 1025 (2013). 
25 Undersigned Attorney, supra note 22, at 1011. 
26 Collins,  supra note 21, at 987. 
27 WASHINGTON RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.8(m); see also Jacqueline McMurtrie, 
Unconscionable Contracting for Indigent Defense: Using Contract Theory to Invalidate 
Conflict of Interest Clauses in Fixed-Fee Contracts, 39 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 773 
(2006). 
28 Gene Johnson, State High Court Limits Public-Defender Caseloads, SEATTLE TIMES, 
June 15, 2012, http://seattletimes.com/html/localnews/2018446807_caseload16m.html. 
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The issue opens with Kim Taylor-Thompson’s article Gideon at Fifty – 
Golden Anniversary or Mid-Life Crisis.29 Taylor-Thompson begins by 
referencing the wealth of symposia and ceremonies across the country 
honoring Gideon v. Wainwright’s fiftieth anniversary. It is a bittersweet 
anniversary because, as she notes, the individual right championed by 
Gideon’s birth is under current attack by a system that values efficiency 
over effectiveness in the pursuit of justice.30 Artfully framing her article as a 
journey through Gideon’s life stages, Taylor-Thompson points out that 
Gideon spent its young adult life under attack and underfunded. She argues: 
“States were less intent on building systems that guaranteed effective 
assistance of counsel as a bedrock principle, and more drawn toward 
systems that guaranteed rock bottom prices.”31 Still, there were moments of 
vitality. For instance, defenders mobilized to bring public attention to 
practices preventing the poor from receiving Gideon’s guarantee, and the 
American Bar Association issued the Ten Principles of a Public Defense 
Delivery System.32 
Now that we are in Gideon’s mid-life stage, Taylor-Thompson urges 
defenders to advocate in multiple forums and broaden their constituencies 
to change the public dialogue about social and racial justice. She discusses 
the successful example of Florida public defender Carlos Martinez, who 
brought the problem of transporting juveniles to court in shackles to the 
attention of the Florida Bar Association and worked to shine light on the 
shameful practice through the media. These actions led to a 2010 Florida 
Supreme Court ruling barring the indiscriminate shackling of juveniles.33 
Building on the collaborative theme, Taylor-Thompson calls upon 
legislators to protect the right to counsel against attack; defenders to think 
beyond excellence in the courtroom and work with client’s communities to 
                                                                                                                           
29  Taylor-Thompson, supra note 23, at 867. 
30 Id. at 871. 
31 Id. at 874. 
32 Id.  
33 Id. at 877-79. 
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uncover issues of social and racial injustice and bring those stories to the 
media; prosecutors to recognize and champion for strong advocates on both 
sides; and students to “fearlessly push boundaries in a way that actually 
creates change and force others around them to think differently.”34 In this 
way, Taylor-Thompson concludes, our era will not be Gideon’s mid-life 
crisis, but its golden anniversary.35 
Robert C. Boruchowitz’s article, It is Long Past Time to Provide Lawyers 
for Misdemeanor Defendants Who Cannot Afford to Hire Their Own, 
addresses the routine violation of Gideon’s mandate in misdemeanor 
courts.36 Boruchowitz’s research and anecdotal evidence document the 
widespread denial of counsel to indigent defendants in misdemeanor courts 
across our country. In many instances, the only attorney that the defendant 
is encouraged to speak with is the prosecutor.37 Failure to protect the right 
of counsel, as Boruchowitz argues, has significant consequences for the 
accused, the integrity of the court and society’s respect for its role, and for 
individual judges who do not honor the right to counsel.38 As he notes, the 
majority of people who come into contact with the criminal justice system 
do so through misdemeanor courts.39 Moreover, the consequences of 
misdemeanor convictions can be severe, and misdemeanor prosecutions 
have a disparate impact on poor people and people of color.40 Boruchowitz 
advocates for full protection of the right to counsel in misdemeanor court 
and offers concrete alternatives, such as diversion and reclassification of 
misdemeanor offenses, to fund the cost of fulfilling Gideon’s promise.41 
Boruchowitz recounts his efforts working with the Department of Public 
Advocacy to effect change in Kentucky’s misdemeanor courts. In 2011, 
                                                                                                                           
34 Id. at 882-83. 
35 Id. at  884. 
36 Boruchowitz, supra note 2. 
37 Id. at 894. 
38 Id.  
39 Id. at 893. 
40 Id. at 892. 
41 Id. at 895. 
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when he began his work, only 29.3 percent of misdemeanor defendants 
were appointed counsel.42 After Boruchowitz spent about sixteen months 
observing proceedings and meeting with defenders and judges, the 
appointment rate went up dramatically (an average of 32 percent) in the five 
counties where he focused his efforts.43 Examples from other states support 
Boruchowitz’s argument that change can occur through education, 
advocacy, and litigation. He persuasively argues that jurisdictions 
embracing Gideon can reap cost savings by implementing innovative 
reform. Boruchowitz puts forward data establishing that jurisdictions can 
save resources through diversion programs, decriminalization, and social 
service intervention.44 Boruchowitz concludes that providing attorneys to 
indigent defendants in misdemeanor courts, as mandated by the 
Constitution, will enhance society’s respect for the law.45 
Steven Zeidman begins his article, Gideon, Looking Backward, Looking 
Forward, Looking in the Mirror, with the observation that “the undeniable 
truth is that Gideon’s original request for a lawyer to be appointed to 
represent him at trial has devolved into lawyers appointed to simply 
negotiate plea bargains.”46 He urges public defenders to look “in the mirror” 
and reflect upon how their contributions have led to Gideon’s failed 
promise. Zeidman posits that until the plea mentality is changed, adding 
lawyers and reducing caseloads will “still not achieve the ‘promise of 
Gideon,’ as envisioned by Gideon himself—a lawyer to represent the 
accused at trial.”47 He then discusses a recent trilogy of Supreme Court 
cases: Padilla,48 Lafler,49 and Frye,50 which evidence the Court’s new-
                                                                                                                           
42 Id. at 900. 
43 Id. at 901. 
44 Id. at 913-19. 
45 Id. at 913. 
46 Zeidman, supra note 20, at 937-38. 
47 Id. at  941-42. 
48 Padilla v. Kentucky, 559 U.S. 356 (2010) (defense counsel’s failure to provide client 
with adequate immigration-impact advice regarding a plea offer is ineffective assistance). 
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found willingness to delve into the attorney-client relationship in order to 
evaluate the quality of a defense attorney’s advice about a plea offer. 
Zeidman’s thorough analysis of the cases leads him to surmise that their 
true potential lies in the Court’s consideration of ethical standards, and its 
incorporation of those standards into its effective assistance of counsel 
analysis to answer the question of what constitutes ethical and constitutional 
advice regarding whether to accept or reject a plea.51 
Zeidman calls upon public defenders to arm themselves with the lessons 
from the trilogy of cases to better serve their clients, especially when faced 
with judges urging them to move faster or handle more cases. He advises 
defense attorneys to “eschew[] any pleas until they are in a position to give 
constitutionally adequate advice on a range of issues confronting their 
clients.”52 Zeidman makes a compelling case that the Court’s heightened 
attention to defense attorney counseling, in all facets of criminal defense 
representation, should yield tangible benefits in the quality of 
representation, in addition to the demise of “meet, greet, and plead” 
lawyering.53 Zeidman concludes: 
Just maybe then, this trilogy of cases will nudge the Criminal Court 
toward the adversarial system it theoretically is supposed to be, and 
Gideon’s original plea for lawyers to represent the indigent at trial will 
move a little closer to realization. The transformative potential is there, if 
lawyers for the poor are willing to look in the mirror and find it.54 
Travis Stearns, in Legal Financial Obligations: Fulfilling the Promise of 
Gideon by Reducing the Burden, grounds his argument for reform of 
Washington State’s Legal Financial Obligation (LFO) structure in Gideon’s 
                                                                                                                           
49 Lafler v. Cooper, 132 S.Ct. 1376 (2012) (defense counsel renders ineffective 
assistance by providing inaccurate legal advice to a client about plea offer). 
50 Missouri v. Frye, 132 S. Ct. 1399 (2012) (client’s right to effective assistance of 
counsel was violated when defense attorney failed to timely communicate plea offer). 
51 Zeidman, supra note 20, at 958-60. 
52 Id. at 952. 
53 Id. at 961. 
54 Id. at 962. 
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promise that our criminal justice system treat persons fairly.55 Stearns writes 
of the crushing LFOs imposed as part of a criminal defendant’s sentence, 
and documents the difficulty in obtaining relief based upon an inability to 
pay.56 These financial burdens have a disproportionate impact on indigent 
defendants, who often struggle with other issues upon reentry such as 
housing, mental health treatment needs, unemployment, child support, and 
drug and alcohol treatment.57 The accrual of interest, at a 12 percent rate, 
creates a criminal justice debt that indigent defendants can never resolve, 
resulting in a lifetime of disenfranchisement. Stearns discusses research 
showing the significant disparity across Washington State in the imposition 
of LFOs. The charges, county of adjudication, and the decision to exercise 
the right to trial contribute to higher fines and fees.58 Latinos and male 
defendants are assessed higher fees than other demographic groups, and 
nonviolent drug charges are associated with higher median fines and fee 
amounts than violent felonies.59 
Stearns argues that Washington State’s LFO structure has not proven 
effective in generating revenue for the state.60 He advocates for systemic 
reform on many levels to end the incarceration and jailing of individuals for 
failure to pay a criminal justice debt. Stearns provides guidance to 
defenders on how to best advocate for clients at sentencing and post-
sentencing hearings. He urges jurisdictions to undertake alternative 
solutions similar to the City of Spokane’s relicensing program. 
Additionally, he calls for the Washington State Legislature to follow the 
example of Massachusetts, which will require a cost-benefits analysis 
before fines are imposed.61 Stearns concludes that these reforms will reduce 
                                                                                                                           
55 Stearns, supra note 21. 
56 Id. at 972-73. 
57 Id. at 969-70. 
58 Id. at 968. 
59 Id. at 967-68. 
60 Id. at 969-70. 
61 Id. at 968-77. 
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disparity and disproportionality in our criminal justice system, and ensure 
that only people who willfully fail to pay are punished.62 This in turn, 
Stearns predicts, will create a fairer system of justice, resulting in an 
increased respect for the courts.63 
Nancy Collin’s article, Does the Right to Counsel on Appeal End as You 
Exit the Court of Appeals?, examines the common scenario of appointed 
counsel withdrawing immediately after a court of appeals issues its 
decision.64 This leaves the indigent appellant unrepresented when seeking 
review from the Washington Supreme Court. The only way to make the right 
to appeal meaningful, Collins contends, is to protect a client’s rights during 
all stages of the appellate process. Collins discusses the many benefits that 
can result from seeking review of an appellate decision. Most obviously, the 
client may prevail and have a conviction reversed, in which case the cost of 
the appeal is borne by the prosecution.65 Additionally, review extends the life 
of the appeal, so a change of law occurring during that time will apply to the 
client.66 
Finally, the process of seeking review is critical to preserving an 
appellant’s rights in federal court through exhaustion.67 Collins asserts that 
appointed counsel should only withdraw after direct and explicit 
conversations with the client, which explain the matter to the client so that 
he or she can make an informed decision about whether to seek review.68 
Although Collins agrees that appointed counsel should not file frivolous 
petitions, she maintains that “the decision as to the frivolousness of an issue 
should be made with a thumb on the scale that favors vindicating the 
client’s issues and rights.”69 Collins concludes that Washington’s strongly 
                                                                                                                           
62 Id. at 977-79. 
63 Id. 
64 Collins, supra note 21. 
65 Id. at 997-98. 
66 Id. at 1000. 
67 Id. at 997. 
68 Id. at 1000. 
69 Id. at 1001-03. 
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protected, and constitutionally guaranteed, right to appeal should expressly 
require appointed counsel to file a petition for review to the Washington 
Supreme Court, when it would serve the client to do so.70 
Marc Boman moderates a discussion between Washington Supreme 
Court Justices Susan Owens and Sheryl Gordon McCloud and Office of 
Public Defense (OPD) Director Joanne Moore in The Undersigned Attorney 
Hereby Certifies—The Washington Supreme Court Rule on Standards and 
Its Implications.71 In 2012, the Washington Supreme Court adopted new 
Standards for Indigent Defense Services, which include guidelines for 
caseload limits and types of cases, administrative costs, limitations on 
private practice and qualifications of attorneys, appellate representation, and 
use of legal interns.72 Upon the standards adoption, Chief Justice Barbara 
Madsen stated, “We understand the delicate balance in providing a 
constitutional right to an attorney and the monetary impact on local 
governments. By delaying implementation of the caseload limits until 2013, 
our goal is to move towards the promise of the landmark US Supreme Court 
case of Gideon v. Wainwright.” 73 
Boman begins the panel discussion by providing a brief history of the 
promulgation and adoption of the Indigent Defense Standards.74 Justice 
Owens and Justice Gordon McCloud candidly discuss their experiences 
prior to taking a seat on the Washington Supreme Court. Justice Owens 
served as a trial court judge in Clallam County, which has a tradition of 
strong public defense. Prior to serving as a trial court judge, Justice Owens 
maintained a private criminal defense practice. For a short period of time, 
she handled the district court contract and never thought to treat her 
                                                                                                                           
70 Id. at 1004. 
71 Undersigned Attorney, supra note 22. 
72 Supreme Court Adopts Standards for Indigent Defense; Case Limit Guidelines 
Effective in 2013, available at http://www.courts.wa.gov/newsinfo/?fa=newsinfo.internet 
detail&newsid=2135. 
73 Id. 
74 Undersigned Attorney, supra note 22, at 1005-06. 
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appointed clients any differently than her private clients. Thus, it was a 
surprise for her to learn about the practice in other counties, where indigent 
defenders did not argue suppression hearings and never went to trial.75 
Justice McCloud worked as a public defender before she began to do 
appellate work. She tells of seeing examples of attorneys who fell down on 
the job, and places the blame on overworked, underpaid lawyers with 
inadequate standards.76 Joanne Moore discusses OPD’s role in securing 
funding for criminal public defense, parent termination cases, and appellate 
representation. She contends that the standards are unique because they 
bring instant accountability.77 Moore reports that although attorneys and 
courts were anxious about standard implementation, an OPD survey showed 
that the certification process is working well and is relatively problem-
free.78 The panel discussion concludes by taking questions and answers 
from the audience about the impact and potential of reduced caseloads for 
indigent defenders. 
Janet Moore, in G Forces, Gideon v. Wainwright and Matthew Adler’s 
Move Beyond Cost-Benefit Analysis, explores criminal justice reform 
through the interdisciplinary lens of Matthew Adler’s book, Well-Being and 
Fair Distribution: Beyond Cost Benefit Analysis.79 Moore first summarizes 
Adler’s book, published in 2012, and his economic theory, which 
emphasizes priority being given to improving the lot of less well-off 
individuals, while still acknowledging the role of personal responsibility, or 
free will in the economic calculus. The nuances of Adler’s theory, and its 
contrast with other economic theories, cannot be done justice within this 
introduction. Suffice it to say that Moore discusses these in an engaging and 
adroit manner, taking the reader through the complexities and nuances of 
Adler’s methodology. 
                                                                                                                           
75 Id. at 1006-10. 
76 Id. at 1010-12. 
77 Id. at 1012. 
78 Id. at 1014. 
79 Moore, supra note 24. 
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Moore achieves her articulated goals to “sketch key aspects of [Adler’s] 
argument for a continuous prioritarian decision-making model, to note areas 
for future refinement and development of the argument, and to take some 
initial steps towards testing the argument’s application in the real-world 
context of the struggle for improved public defense services.”80 Her article 
explains how Adler’s methodologies, his framework for ranking outcomes 
to favor the enhancement of individual human well-being, and his 
methodology of giving preference to choices that improve the lot of the less 
well-off resonate with core commitments of public defense reformers to 
secure liberty and equal, fair treatment, particularly in confrontations 
between an individual and concentrated government power.81 She 
thoughtfully explores the development of the right-to-counsel doctrine as a 
real-world application of Adler’s theory.82 Moore offers Adler’s approach 
as an intriguing resource for academics and activists to address ongoing 
struggles over fairness.83 Moore concludes that this could help “shift 
‘grasstop reform’—that is, efforts driven by elites on behalf of the less well-
off—toward grassroots change,” thereby empowering low income people 
and people of color to “participate more directly in the formation, 
implementation, and oversight of the criminal justice policies in which 
indigent defense services play such a critical role.”84 
The need for change resounds throughout the series of SJSJ articles 
dedicated to commemorating Gideon’s anniversary. The authors also 
express hope that our justice system can achieve Gideon’s promise of 
fundamental fairness for indigent defendants. These excellent additions to 
the scholarly discourse are a significant contribution to ensuring what 
Gideon’s Trumpet heralded: “In the future, the name ‘Gideon’ will stand for 
                                                                                                                           
80 Id. at 1052. 
81 Id. at 1036, 1047. 
82 Id. at 1052-60. 
83 Id. at 1066. 
84 Id.  
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the great principle that the poor are entitled to the same type of justice as 
those who are able to afford counsel.”85 
                                                                                                                           
85 LEWIS, supra note 3, at 239. 
